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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/03/2004 Accident number: 244 
Accident time: 07:45 Accident Date: 09/08/1998 
Where it occurred: Shorandam, Kandahar Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 01/02/1999 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
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Accident report 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in 
September 1999. The following summarises its content. 
At the time of the accident the demining group was using a one-man drill and two-man 
teams. 
The victim had been a deminer for eight years. He had last been on leave 15 days before 
and last attended a revision course seven days before. The accident occurred on ground 
described as "grazing and residential" land in "medium hard" condition. The mine was 
identified from pieces found at the site. 
The investigators found that the victim was investigating a detector reading in a squatting 
position and using a pick. He had used two markers. He "finished one layer" [presumably 
slicing layers from the ground] and rechecked with the detector. The reading was still there 
so he started excavating again without placing any markers. He hit a mine at 07:45.  
The accident investigators reported that he was not injured because he was wearing 
protection. [See “Related papers”.] 
The victim's visor was broken and his pick was damaged.  
The Team sub-commander said that the mine was very deep and victim made a mistake 
placing the marks. 
The Section Leader said that the hardness of the ground may have contributed to the 
incident, that the victim may have placed the marks poorly, and that he sustained "superficial 
injuries" and deafness. He thought that back-hoes might help prevent such incidents. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the victim was using 
unauthorised drills and equipment. His field supervision was poor. They acknowledged that 
the mine may have been deeply buried but thought that problem "could have been 
overcome" with the use of correct procedures. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended a return to the three-marks procedure for indicating detector 
readings pending a re-evaluation of the two-mark method. They further recommended that 
the Section Leader be disciplined and demoted. They added that the accident illustrated the 
advantage of wearing visors and jackets because the victim was uninjured and should be 
referenced in training courses. [See “Related papers”.] They added that the quality of the 
visor should be examined, pointing out that it had "broken into pieces". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 318 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Thin, short visor 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Arms 
minor Head 
severe Hearing 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An initial casualty report described the victim's injuries as: "Head (frontal area) superficial 
wounds and left and right arm superficial multiple wounds. Both ears have deafness." The 
victim's vital signs were a pulse of 80/min, BP of 120/80 and Respiration of 18/min. 
The casualty report included a medic's sketch on which a left shoulder and forehead 
laceration and hearing damage were indicated.  [A doctor's report from the field hospital was 
not translated - the failure to translate it being unique among the recent records at this UN 
MAC]. 
An initial accident report sent to the UN MAC reported that the victim sustained minor head 
and arm injuries, along with severe hearing loss. That report also mentioned that the victim 
was treated on site and taken to the ICRC hospital in Kandahar, then returned to the field 
medical unit. [The investigators did not mention the ICRC or the injuries recorded by the field 
medic.]  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it is possible that the 
victim was working as directed by his organization when the accident occurred. If the victim 
were working with his visor raised, that would represent a "Field control inadequacy" 
because his error was not corrected by his partner or his field supervisors. 
The failure of the victim's thin (3mm) visor probably indicates that it had hardened with age 
and the failure to replace it was management's responsibility. The secondary cause is listed 
as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The difference between the initial injury report and the investigator's findings is profound - 
leading one to wonder whether the investigators took so long to conduct their inquiry (their 
report was stamped 1st February 1999 - almost six months later) that the demining group 
decided to make light of the accident by pretending that the victim (who's injuries were 
minor) had not been injured at all.  It seems unlikely that he would have been taken to the 
ICRC hospital if he had not been injured.  
Whether or not the demining group decided to make light of the injuries, it seems that the 
accident investigators may have suppressed parts of the available information in order to 
make an argument supporting the use of visors and frag-jackets. They ignored the initial 
report of injury, made little of the shattered visor, and failed to get the field doctor's report 
translated. These do not promote confidence in their objective assessment of the accident. 
  
Related papers 
Sketch maps of the accident site were included in the accident file. 
A photograph of the victim's visor showed it in four pieces. It is possible that these caused 
his forehead laceration.  
3 
Documents were not made available for copying. 
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